DEVFUZZ: Automatic Device Model-Guided Device Driver Fuzzing

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


+ SAMSUNG



Device Driver Security

Two Interfaces



Threat Model

- An attacker can plug in a malicious device (e.g. USB hack stick)
- A device can feed malformed inputs to exploit security vulnerabilities in a device driver (e.g. buffer overflows)

Real World Examples






engadget Sections V

New Xbox 360 hacked to play 'backup' discs, public release underway? (video)

Challenge 1: Large Device Input Space



- Memory Mapped IO (MMIO)
- Port IO (PIO)
- Oirect Memory Access (DMA)
- Interrupt (IRQ)

Testing all possible input is unscalable and ineffective

Challenge 2: Dynamic Probing

- Many bus architectures (e.g., PCIe, USB) allow users to plug-in new devices.
- OS pairs a driver with a device and initialize it using a probing function.

```
int pcnet32 probe(struct pci dev * pdev) {
        void *ioaddr = pci resource start(pdev, 0);
        int err = -ENODEV;
        int chip version;
       if (ioread(ioaddr+0x10) != 4
6
            ioread(ioaddr+0x12) & 0xA) {
8
            return err;
9
       chip version = ioread(ioaddr+0x10)
10
                        ioread(ioaddr+0x10) << 16);</pre>
11
       if (chip_version != 0xABCD) {
12
13
            return err;
14
15
16
        return 0;
17
```

Passing probing conditions require device-specific input

Can we test device drivers without actual devices?

pcnet32 network device driver probing function

Prior Work: Testing Device Drivers

Testing with real hardware

- e.g., PeriScope [NDSS'19]
- Hardware may not be readily available

Symbolic/Concolic execution

- e.g., SymDrive [OSDI'12], DriFuzz [SEC'22]
- Slow

Manual software model (for probing) + Fuzzing

- e.g., USBFuzz [SEC' 20]
- Unscalable. Error-prone


Static analysis (for probing) + Fuzzing

- e.g., PrIntFuzz [ISSTA'22]
- Low success rate for probing due to imprecise static analysis

Our Approach

Goals: Testing device drivers

- without actual devices
- without manual modeling
- without (input space) state explosion



Step 1: automatic model generation

Step 2: model-guided fuzzing

Using Symbolic Execution for Probe Model

Built on S²E [ASPLOS 2011]

- QEMU for emulation
- KLEE for symbolic execution

Symbolic Execution

- Run probing functions with symbolic MMIO/PIO address space regions
- Successful probing
 - Use the SMT solver to solve the constraint to get concretized values
- Failed probing
 - Terminate the case and explore alternative paths

"Concretized" Probe Model


Allow DevFuzz to pass (complex) probing path constraints

Probe Model Example

```
int pcnet32 probe(struct pci dev * pdev) {
        void *ioaddr = pci resource start(pdev, 0);
        int err = -ENODEV;
        int chip version;
 6
        if (ioread(ioaddr+0x10) != 4
            ioread(ioaddr+0x12) & 0xA) {
            return err;
10
        chip version = ioread(ioaddr+0x10)
                        ioread(ioaddr+0x10) << 16);</pre>
11
        if (chip version != 0xABCD) {
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            return err;
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        return 0;
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```

pcnet32 network device driver probing function

MMIO Address Space




A state machine of device register values

Using Program Analysis for MMIO/PIO Models

LLVM-based Static Program Analysis

```
csr0 = lp->a->read csr (ioaddr, CSR0);
    while (csr0 & 0x8f00) & --boguscnt >= 0
        if (csr0 == 0xffff)
            break;
       lp->a->write csr (ioaddr, CSR0,
 8
                          csr0 & ~0x004f);
        if (csr0 == 0x4000) {
 9
10
        if (csr0 == 0x1000) {
12
13
        csr0 = lp->a->read_csr (ioaddr, CSR0);
15
16
17
```

- O IO wrapper analysis
- O address analysis
- O value flow analysis



pcnet32 network device driver interrupt handler

Guides fuzzing inputs

And More ...

DMA Model

- DevFuzz uses dynamic/static program analyses
- DMA buffer address/shape analysis

IRQ

- Simple model
- Generate IRQs using a timer

Model Generality and Reusability

- The generated Probe, MMIO, PIO Models reflect device-specific properties
- The models generated from one OS (Linux) can be reused to test device drivers of another OS (FreeBSD or Windows)

Evaluation Summary

- Large-scale security evaluation
 - Tested 150 Linux drivers
 - Reused device models to test 25 FreeBSD and 16 Windows drivers
- Small-scale code coverage evaluation
 - 17 network device drivers
 - Compared with prior work: PrintFuzz [ISSTA'22] and DriFuzz [SEC'22]
 - Compared with manually-developed QEMU device models (not shown in this talk)


Security Evaluation

| os | Tested | Probed | Bugs/Crash | Patched |
|---------|--------|--------|------------|---------|
| Linux | 150 | 112 | 63 | 39 |
| FreeBSD | 25 | 14 | 8 | 2 |
| Windows | 16 | 8 | 1 | 0 |
| All | 191 | 134 | 72 | 41 |

- For Linux: 75% (112/150) were successfully probed via symbolic execution
 - Some unsupported features (e.g., IRQ during symbolic execution)
 - Complex path constraints (e.g., checksum)
- For FreeBSD/Windows: About half Probe Models were reusable
- 72 Bugs (1 CVE) were reported (including FreeBSD/Windows cases)
- 56% (41/72) were patched to the mainstream

Coverage Comparison with Prior Works

- PrintFuzz [ISSTA'22] uses static analysis to pass probing path constraints, followed by fuzzing
- DriFuzz [SEC'22] uses concolic execution
- DevFuzz achieves better
 - Successful probing rate
 - Code coverage



Conclusion

- DevFuzz leverages symbolic execution, program analysis, and fuzzing to enable testing device drivers
 - without actual devices
 - without manual device modeling
 - without (input space) state explosion
- DevFuzz uncovered 72 bugs (41 patched)
- DevFuzz achieved higher code coverage than prior works
- DevFuzz were able to test a large set of device drivers without devices across three different OSes (Linux, FreeBSD, and Windows

Q&A